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“Either way, Kerry is screwed.”

The Corner on National Review Online has more on John Kerry under seige. Based on the Democrats’ disorganized and highly reactive stance, it’s fair to assume that the Bush/Cheney team is inside the Kerry/Edwards OODA loop, as Hugh Hewitt observes.
The post on The Corner grew from this article.

UPDATE: More from The Belmont Club:

But the more fascinating historical question is why the two parties should have evolved so differently. One possible reason is that the Democrats are more a coalition than a consistent point of view, the proverbial “Big Tent” defined by nonmembership in the the other party. At first glance, this would appear refute the conventional wisdom that the Democrats are the party of the Left but on closer examination better explains how the Left came to thrive in this ecology. The characteristic of coalitions, or “national united fronts” as they are known abroad, is that they can be more easily manipulated by a minority cadre of activists. That was historically true of Bolshevik-led movements and may be why the Islamic extremists can dominate the agenda of Islam, which unlike Roman Catholicism has no hierarchical clerical structure. If ideological extremism has a natural home, it will be in the midst of the lost.
The Republican mystery is deeper still because unlike the Democrats they were not (if one excludes neoconservatives) believed to have any articulated ideology. To some extent, one became a Republican before joining the party. But however that may be, as Dick Morris demonstrates, America has entered the 21st century with two parties: one with a remarkably united vision of what it wants and the other searching for an answer — after it searches for the question.

Then, an overview of net-centric warfare and OODA loops, followed by this:

In an earlier, low tech era, this phenomenon was referred to in the German Army as “saddle orders”. Because the general principles of the campaign were so well understood by lower-level commanders, Guderian and Rommel could redirect subordinates and trust them to do the “right thing”, that is, act consistently within the agreed strategic framework. They could give orders from the “saddle”. In contrast, the French High Command had to laboriously consider its reaction to each threat. It was this kind of confidence in the Age of Sail which enabled Nelson to break the French line at Trafalgar. Nelson’s captains had served together so long they were like a basketball team that could blind-pass to each other, so that his pre-battle signal consisted simply of “England expects every man to do his duty”. Both the German Army of 1940 and Nelson’s fleet of 1805 were inferior to the enemy in materiel and numbers. But it did not matter. The surprise of 2004 may be that the Mainstream Media, like the Chars of the French Army or the sailing wonders of Villeneuve, will not matter at all.

L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace.

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